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R v. Butler: Revisiting the Feminist Debates on
Pornography
The debate between obscenity and free speech, between feminists
and civil libertarians was recently played out in Canada, when the owner
of a pornography book store was charged with selling obscene materials
and challenged the obscenity provisions as violating his rights to freedom
of expression. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada,
which has ruled on the debate between obscenity and free speech. At the
level of constitutional and criminal law, the issue is now resolved.
However, the politics of the issue remain hotly contested. Even within
feminist communities, the issue of pornography has been controversial
and divisive. The decision of the Supreme Court may have resolved the
legal issue, but it has not laid to rest the deep and long standing debates
on the vexing questions of expression, censorship, violence against women
and the representation of sexuality.
In R.v. Butlerl the Supreme Court of Canada rejected a constitutional
challenge to the obscenity provisions of the Criminal Code. Section
163(8) of the Code was challenged as violating the right to freedom of
expression as guaranteed by section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms. Section 163(8) defines obscenity, it states:
For the purposes of this Act, any publication a dominant
characteristic of which is the undue exploitation of sex, or of s.x
and anyone or more of the following subjects, namely, crime,
horror, cruelty and violence, shall be deemed to be obscene.
Justice Sopinka, writing for the majority, began by reviewing the
tests that have been developed to interpret the definition of obscenity.
The test that has been established for detennining the undue exploitation
of sex is the community standards test - that is - what the community as
a whole will tolerate others being exposed to. The Court reviewed some
of the other tests that have also been invoked to detennine whether
material constitutes undue exploitation of sex, including the "degradation
or dehumanisation" test, and the artistic defense. The Court observed
that there is some confusion emerging in the case law as to the relationship
between these various tests. In attempting to clarify the test, and
I
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interpreting the definition of obscenity as found in section 163(8), the
Court held that it was useful to divide pornography into three categories
(1) explicit sex coupled with violence (2) explicit sex without violence
that subjects people to treaunent that is degrading or dehumanising and
(3) explicit sex without violence that is not degrading or dehumanising.
In the Court's view, the first category is explicitly mentioned within
section 163(8) and almost always constitutes the undue exploitation of
sex. The second category may be undue exploitation of sex if the risk of
harm is substantial. The third category is generally tolerated, and will
not, with the exception of the involvement of children, constitute undue
exploitation of sex.
The Court then turned to consider the constitutionality
of the
provision. It is important to note that there are two steps in considering
a constitutional challenge under the Canadian Charter of Rights. The
first step involves a consideration of whether the impugned law violates
the right or freedom in question. If this first step is answered in the
affim1ative, the second step involves a consideration of whether the law
is a reasonable limit within the scope of section 1 of the Charter.2 Justice
Sopinka held that section 163 violated the right to freedom of expression
in section 2(b) of the Charter. The Supreme Court has consistently adopted
an expansive approach to the protection provided by section 2(b), holding
that the content or meaning cannot exclude the activities or statements
from the scope of protection accorded by section 20(b), no matter how
offensive those activities or statements may be to the Court.3
Meaning sought to be expressed need not be 'redeeming' in the
eyes of the court to merit the protection of s.2(b) whose purpose
is to ensure that thoughts and feelings may be conveyed freely in
non-violent ways without fear of censure.4
With regard to section 163, the Court held that in "both the purpose
and effect", the section restricted "the communication of certain types of
materials based on their content".s As such, the section prohibited
expressive activity, and thus, violated section 2(b) of the Charter.
In considering the second step of the constitutional challenge, the
2

3

4

,

Section 1 of the Charter provides that the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the
Charter are subject to "reasonable limits prescribed by law as demonstrably justified
in a free and democratic society".
R.v. Keegstra (1990) 61 C.C.C. (3d) 1; Reference re: sections 193 and 195.1(1)(c)
of the Criminal Code (1990) 56 C.C.C. (3d) 65.
R.v. Butler, supra note 1, at 473.
Id.
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Court..held that although section 163 of the Code violated section 2(b) it
was a reasonable limit within the meaning of section 1. First, the Court
held that the objective of section 163 was of sufficient importance to
override the violation of freedom of expression. The Court rejected the
arguments of the appellants that the objective was the State imposition
of a standard of public and sexual morality. Rather, the Court found that
the objective of section 163 was "the avoidance of harm resulting from
anti-social attitudinal changes that exposure to obscene material causes
and the public interest in maintaining a "decent society".6 The Court
cited with approval the description of the harm of pornography in the
Report of the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs, 1978 :
The clear and unquestionable danger of this type of material is
that it reinforces some unhealthy tendencies in Canadian society.
The effect of this type of material is to reinforce male-female
stereotypes to the detriment of both sexes. It attempts to make
degradation, humiliation, victirnisation and violence in human
relationships appear normal and acceptable. A society which
holds that egalitarian, non-violence, consensualism and mutuality
are basic to any human interaction, whether sexual or other, is
clearly justified in controlling and prohibiting any medium of
depiction, description or advocacy which violates these principles.
In the Court's view, this objective was a pressing and substantial one
If true equality between male and female persons is to be achieved,
we cannot ignore the threat to equality resulting from exposure
to audiences or certain types of violent and degrading material.
Materials portraying women as a class as objects for sexual
exploitation and abuse have a negative impact on "the individuals
sense of self-worth and acceptance".?
Secondly, in considering the proportionality requirement,S the Court
held that there was a rational connection between the impugned legislation
and the objective. While observing that any "direct link between obscenity
6

7

8

Id.
Id. at 479.
This aspect of the section I analysis is known as the proportionality test, which has
three requirements. (1) the existence of a rational connection between the impugned
measures and the objective; (2) minimal impairment of the right or freedom, and
(3) a proper balance between the effects of limiting measures and the legislative
objective.
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and harm to society" might be "difficult if not impossible to establish,"9
the Court held that it was nevertheless reasonable for Parliament to have
"a reasonable apprehension of harm resulting from the desensitisation of
individuals exposed to materials that depict violence, cruelty and
dehumanisation in sexual relations"l0
On the question of minimum impairment, the Court held that section
163(8) does not proscribe all sexually explicit material, but only that
which is violent, degrading and/or dehumanising. Secondly, the section
does not include sexually explicit materials that have scientific, artistic
or literary merit. Further, the Court rejected the arguments of the civil
liberties intervenors that objectives may be met by other, less restrictive
means. 11 In the Court's view, "given the gravity of the harm and the
threat to the values at stake" other less restrictive means would not equal
the measure adopted by Parliament in section 168. In conclusion, the
Court held that section 168 was a reasonable limit within the meaning of
section 1 of the Charter, and thus upheld the provision.
The decision was met with mixed reactions. Feminists approved;
civil libertarians disapproved, or so it seemed. This reaction paralleled
the interventions in the case. The feminist legal organisation LEAF
(Women's LEgal Education and Action Fund) had intervened in the
case, submitting arguments supporting the obscenity provisions. Several
civil liberties organisations had intervened on the other side, submitting
arguments against the constitutionality of the provisions.12 Indeed, the
Supreme Court decision was seen by many, and was presented in the
media as having adopted the feminist position on pornography.
However, the debate over pornography not only pits feminists against
civil libertarians, but perhaps more significantly, also pits feminists against
sex trade workers, and feminists against feminists. Indeed, pornography
has been an extremely divisive issue with the feminist movement. While
some feminists, particularly
radical feminists, have argued that
pornography contributes to and/or is a form of violence against women,
and must therefore be prohibited, other feminists, particularly socialist
feminists, echoing the voices of women in the sex trade industry, have
9
10

11

Id. at 483.
Id. at 484.
Id. at 486. The Court held "Once it has been established that the objective is the
avoidance of harm caused by the degradation which many women feel as "victims"
of the message of obscenity, and of the negative impact exposure to such material

has on perceptions and attitudes towards women, it is untenable to argue that these
12

harms could be avoided by placing restrictions on access to such material."
The Canadian Civil Liberties Association, the Manitoba Association for Rights and
Liberties, and the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association.
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opposed this characterisation of pornography, and have been concerned
with the legal implications of censorship and criminalisation. Censorship
is seen to be highly problematic in so far as it gives the State the power
to make decisions over what constitutes obscene material. Under the
guise of seemingly feminist discourse, of protecting women from sexual
violence, the State is free to censor materials according to its own
conservative and moralistic agenda. Any attempt to express sexuality is
suspect and potentially repressed. Criminalisation is also seen to be
problematic in its impact on the women who work in the pornography
industry.
On this question of the impact on women who work in the
pornography industry, the debate closely parallels the debate regarding
prostitution - that is - whether prostitution should be criminalised or
legalised. On one side, it is argued that prostitution is a form of viol"nce
against women, and is inherently degrading and a subordinating activity.13
On the other side of the debate, it is argued that criminalisation only
contributes to the exploitative conditions under which prostitute women
work, empowering the police, the courts and the traffickers to harass
these women. In the debate around pornography, similar arguments are
heard regarding the women who work in the sex trade industry. Feminists
against pornography argue that women are forced to work in the
pornography against their wills, and are the victims of male sexual
violence. Feminists against State censorship and criminalisation are
concerned, on the other hand, with the effect of criminalisation of "the
working conditions of these women. 14 Criminalisation is seen not to
empower women, but to empower the State, through the police and the
courts, to further harass and oppress these women.
In the aftermath of Butler, feminists against censorship have aligned
with civil libertarians, sex trade workers, and gays and lesbians against
what they see as the State's repressive sexual morality. These groups are
13

14

While some have argued that pornography is casually connected to violence against
women, there are no studies that unequivocally and directly link pornography with
violence against women. However, the feminist argument against pornography is
really a more subtle one - that pornography contributes to the representation of
women as sexual objects, and thus, to the construction of women as inferior. Some
feminists argue that the issue is not that pornography leads to violence against
women, but that it is in itself a form of violence against women. Other feminists are
more specifically concerned with the ideological implications of pornography - that
is - with attitudes and images about women created by pornography.
For an excellent review of the different positions of both feminists and sex trade
workers on the issues of prostitution and pornography, see GOOD GIRLSIBAD
GIRLS: SEX TRADE WORKERS AND FEMINISTS FACE TO FACE (Laurie Bell
ed. 1987).
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all concerned about who gets to make these determinations, and what
will be included within the definition of obscenity. Sexual minorities
were worried that they would be unduly targeted. Gays and lesbians, for
example, were worried that the obscenity provisions, if upheld, would be
used to target any depiction of homosexual sexuality. Their worries
were justified. Just several weeks after the Butler decision, a gay bookstore
in Toronto was charged with distributing obscene material. The crime in
this case had nothing to do with violence against women - the crime was
simply the depiction of gay sexuality. In the meanwhile, heterosexual
pornography continues to be accessible on the top shelf of most comer
magazine and video stores. This hypocrisy in the enforcement of the law
is precisely the sort of concern that all those on this side of the debate
are worried about in giving the State the discretion to determine who and
what is obscene, and to impose its conservative and moralistic agenda
under the guise of feminist discourse.
It is important to recognise that each side of the pornography debate
raises some important concerns. Feminists against pornography have
revealed the oppressive conditions in which women are often forced to
work within the industry, and have transformed the discourse in which
we now talk about these issues - from a moralist anti-sex discourse to a
discourse specifically concerned about the effect of pornography on
undermining women's equality rights. It has raised societal consciousness
about the ideological effects of pornography in representing women as
sexual objects and as less than equal citizens. On the other side, feminists
have revealed good reasons to be concerned with both the effect of
censorship
and criminalisation.
Censorship can legitimise the
conservative, moralistic and anti-sex agenda of the State, wherein any
depiction of sexuality is seen to offend the moral fabric of society, and is
thereby obscene. This agenda is one that remains heavily influenced by
a repressive Victorian morality, which continues to permeate our society.
Further, these feminists have revealed problems associated with
criminalisation
for the women in the pornography
industry.
Criminalisation forces the activity underground, where it is more difficult
to control and regulate, and leaves the women within the industry with
no recourse to work to improve their working conditions. Further, the
constant threat of police harassment and criminal sentences only
exacerbates the exploitative conditions under which these women work.
If we are concerned with the exploitative conditions under which women
are forced to work in the industry, then we are attacking the problem at
the wrong level. Censorship is a superficial remedy, that does not begin
to attack the problem at its root. If we are concerned with the production
of pornography in exploitative conditions, then we should be enforcing

Vol. I]

R v. Butler

183

existing laws against pornographers. Tax laws, labour laws including
child labour laws, employment standards, and occupational health and
safety laws may go considerably further in reducing the oppressive
conditions in which women are often forced to work.
In conclusion, it is important to recognise that there is not one
feminist voice, nor one feminist position on the question of pornography.
More than many other issues, pornography highlights the enormous
diversity of opinion within and among feminists. It is important not to
see the Butler decision as either a vindication or condemnation of "the"
feminist position on pornography. Rather, Butler has adopted a particular
approach to pornography, which includes an understanding of pornography
that has been influenced by a particular feminist position on pornography.
This is an important voice. But there are other feminist voices that tell
very different stories about pornography, censorship, the power of the
State and the representation of sexuality.

